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Abstract: While empirical studies that use event-study methodology find on average that the 
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Disentangling the Link Between Stock and Accounting Performance in 
Acquisitions 
 
1. Introduction 
Empirical studies on the overall gains from mergers and acquisitions (M&As) tend to find 
conflicting results depending on whether they use the event-study methodology or accounting 
measures of performance. In detail, there is a consensus among the large body of short-term event 
studies that M&As generate on average significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for the target shareholders and abnormal returns that are close to zero for the bidder (see 
7Table I). The most comprehensive study on the combined gains accruing to the shareholders of 
targets and bidders is Andrade et al. (2001) (see Panel A of Table I for the results from other 
studies). Based on a sample of 3,688 takeovers during the period of 1973 to 1998, they find 
significantly positive combined CARs of about 2%. They interpret the significantly positive 
CARs for the combined firms as evidence that overall acquisitions create gains. Similarly, 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) report that in 76% of 330 tender offers between 1963 and 1988 
the combined return is significantly positive. 1 In addition, the results from long-term event 
studies show that acquisitions generate statistically insignificant CARs for the bidding 
shareholders (see Panel B of Table I). Taken together with the evidence from the short-term event 
studies, this result suggests that mergers create shareholder wealth (Bruner 2004).  
                                                
1  Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) also adjust for the possible motives behind mergers. The motives they 
distinguish are synergies, hubris (Roll 1986) and agency problems (Jensen 1986). If the motivation behind a 
merger is synergies then there should be a positive correlation between the target shareholder gains and the total 
gains. However, if the motive is hubris the correlation should be zero and if the motive is agency problems it 
should be negative. In addition to the finding that in 76% of 330 tender offers between 1963 and 1988 the 
combined return is significantly positive, they also find that the correlation coefficient between the target 
shareholder gains and the combined gains is significantly positive.  
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[Table I about here] 
Conversely, apart from Healey, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) who cover a very short period (1979-
1984) and have a sample size of only 50 mergers,2 studies using accounting measures (see Table 
II for an overview) find that mergers generate statistically significant losses or at least do not 
result in significant improvements in performance. Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005, p.1083) call 
the stylized fact that “mergers often reduce profits, but raise share prices” an empirical puzzle. 
[Table II about here] 
Not only do studies based on the event methodology and those using accounting measures of 
performance arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions as to the overall wealth effects of 
M&As, but they also typically tend to disagree as to the wealth effects generated by individual 
acquisitions. In other words, for the case of individual acquisitions, one may observe any of the 
four different combinations between positive or negative abnormal stock returns on one side and 
positive or negative accounting performance on the other side. While two of these combinations 
(the one consisting of both positive abnormal stock returns and accounting performance and that  
consisting of both negative stock returns and accounting performance) arrive at the same 
conclusion as to the overall gains, the other two arrive at contradictory conclusions. 
These conflicting results give rise to two important questions. First, why do studies based on 
stock returns arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions compared to  those studies based on 
accounting performance? Second, are there any factors advanced by theory which may explain 
each of the four possible combinations between positive or negative stock returns and accounting 
                                                
2  Ramaswamy et al.’s (2003) study covers the period of 1975 to 1990. When they focus on the years 1975 to 1982 
they find a significantly positive improvement in performance, but there is no such significant improvement 
during the post-1982 period. This pattern suggests that Healey et al.’s results are subject to the choice of period 
and that their results cannot be generalized. 
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performance? In other words, can each combination of stock returns and accounting performance 
be explained by a particular motive behind the merger transaction? 
The key contribution of this paper is to reconcile the results from studies using event-study 
methodology with those from the studies using accounting performance by investigating the 
particular motives underlying each of the four combinations of abnormal stock returns and 
accounting performance. In other words, rather than claiming that some or all of the four 
combinations are due to problems of measurement or differences in the perspective underlying 
stock prices and accounting figures (see e.g. Bruner 2004), we argue that each of these 
combinations can be explained by the particular motive behind the acquisition. We find strong 
empirical support for our assertion. 
While our paper has some similarities with the literature on the motives behind takeovers (see 
e.g. Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993), it is also different from that literature in at least three 
important aspects. First, while Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) study the combined stock 
returns and those accruing to the bidder, we focus on the latter. The reason for this is that some of 
the theories which have a priori potential to explain certain combinations of stock returns and 
accounting performance focus on bidders’ gains rather than combined gains. Second, in addition 
to the three motives considered by Berkovitch and Narayanan (the motives they consider are 
synergies, hubris and agency problems), we also consider preemption and the overvaluatio n of 
the bidder’s stock as motives. Finally, we do not just look at abnormal stock returns, but we also 
study the accounting performance and explicitly investigate the link between the two. Hence, 
while we take into account the motives behind the acquisitions, our focus is on explaining the 
relation between stock returns and accounting profits rather than explaining the motives. 
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In other words, the focus and the main contribution of this paper are the explanation of the 
sometimes contradictory outcomes of acquisitions in terms of abnormal stock returns and 
abnormal accounting performance. While the paper refers to the possible motives behind 
acquisitions to explain their outcomes, it does not focus on explaining these motives. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework 
underlying this paper. In particular, the section provides theoretical justifications for each of the 
four different combinations of positive or negative excess stock returns and accounting 
performance. We argue that each combination is caused by a particular motive driving the 
acquisition. While particular combinations of stock returns and accounting performance may a 
priori appear counterintuitive, they can easily be explained by the underlying motive. Section 3 
reviews the methodologies used in this study. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and 
reviews the results from a battery of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The link between stock returns  and accounting performance for bidders in M&As 
This section provides possible theoretical reasons for the four combinations of positive or 
negative abnormal stock returns and accounting performance. The four combinations are reported 
in Figure I. To simplify the exposition, we shall refer to the various combinations by Type I 
(positive abnormal stock returns and as well as positive abnormal accounting performance), Type 
II (positive abnormal stock returns and negative abnormal accounting performance), Type III  
(negative abnormal stock returns and positive abnormal accounting performance) and Type IV 
acquisitions (negative abnormal returns as well as negative  accounting performance). Rather than 
claiming that those of the four types that lead to conflicting conclusions  as to the gains from the 
acquisition, i.e. Type II and Type III, are due to measurement problems and/or differences in the 
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perspectives underlying stock prices and accounting figures, we argue that each of these types or 
combinations can be explained by the particular motive behind the acquisition.  
[Figure I about here] 
The first type of acquisition can be explained by the classical textbook motive (see e.g. Grinblatt 
and Titman (2002)) behind takeovers, i.e. the desire to create shareholder value  via the 
exploitation of synergies (economies of scale or scope). This type of acquisition results in a 
significant improvement in the combined firm’s accounting performance as well as positive 
abnormal stock returns.  
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) provide a theoretical justification for Type II acquisitions. They 
argue that an unprofitable merger (as measured by the merged firm’s accounting performance) 
may be motivated by the fact that it is better for the firm to merge with another firm and thereby 
preempt one of its rivals merging with that firm if there are strong negative externalities to the 
industry from a merger.3 This would then explain why the share price of the firm increases 
despite the merger being unprofitable as measured by its accounting performance. Indeed, given 
the negative externalities from the merger, it is best to be part of a merger (i.e. to be an insider) 
rather than to be affected by a rival’s merger (i.e. to be an outsider). The pre-merger stock price 
of the firm would then reflect the possibility that the  firm may end up as an outsider whereas the 
increase in the stock price at the merger announcement could be explained by the fact that the 
alternative to an unprofitable merger would be even worse. 
                                                
3  Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) provide two examples of mergers driven by the motive of preemption. The first 
example is Northwestern’s acquisition of a 51% voting stake in Continental. Northwestern consented not to vote 
for its stock for six years and not to intervene in the management of Continental. However, crucially, it kept the 
right to veto mergers of Continental with other airlines. The second example is Volvo’s failed attempt of 
acquiring Scania. At the time, Volvo stated that its main motive for taking over Scania was to prevent others 
from doing so. 
 6 
Type III acquisitions have a negative abnormal stock return and positive abnormal accounting 
performance. This type of acquisition can be explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) model 
based on the bidder’s overvalued stock.4 Their model is based on temporary mispricings in the 
securities market. The model assumes that there are some firms that are overvalued at some point 
in time. In the long run, however, the market realizes there is mispricing and the firms’ stock 
prices decrease to their fundamental value. The CEOs of the overvalued companies are assumed 
to be rational and to be aware of the temporary overvaluation. While Shleifer and Vishny do not 
explicitly make this assumption, we assume that the CEOs act in the interest of the current 
shareholders by locking in real assets, i.e. by using their overvalued stock to acquire an 
undervalued (or at least less overvalued) company. The market then realizes that the stock was 
overvalued, but does not realize the full extent of the overvaluation. As a result, the stock price of 
the acquirer declines slightly in the short run to return only to the fundamental value of the 
merged firm in the long run. As Shleifer and Vishny’s model does not make any predictions as to 
the accounting profitability of the merger, it would be possible to observe mergers with negative 
synergies, but that are in line with the predictions of their model. However, given our assumption 
that managers act in the best interests of the shareholders, such mergers are only possible if the 
acquirer is extremely overvalued which would compensate for the loss of profitability. The 
question that arises is whether our assumption that the managers act in the interests of their 
existing shareholders is indeed justified. We shall return to this question in Section 4. 
                                                
4  Effectively, Shleifer and Vishny’s model combines two separate hypotheses into a single one. These hypotheses 
are the means of payment hypothesis (Loughran and Vijh 1997) and the profit extrapolation hypothesis (Rau and 
Vermaelen 1998). The former states that bidders with overvalued equity will pay for acquisitions with stock 
whereas those with undervalued equity will pay with cash. According to the profit extrapolation hypothesis, the 
stock market wrongly extrapolates the bidder’s past performance of so-called glamour firms, i.e. firms with high 
market to book value ratios.  
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Finally, Type IV acquisitions, which generate both negative abnormal stock returns and abnormal 
accounting performance, can be explained by the agency motive as well as Roll’s (1986) hubris 
argument. According to the agency motive (Jensen and Meckling 1976), if left to their own 
devices, managers will invest in negative net present value (NPV) projects (such as value-
destroying acquisitions) in order to increase their remuneration and status. According to Roll’s 
thesis, managers simply make mistakes when valuing the target in an acquisition. Both arguments 
explain the combination of negative abnormal stock returns and negative abnormal accounting 
performance. 5 
3. Data sources, sample selection, measurement of performance and methodology 
This section is structured as follows. We first explain the sample selection process and the data 
sources used. We then discuss the  measurement of abnormal accounting performance and stock 
returns. Finally, we review the methodologies and factors used to predict the occurrence of each 
of the four types of acquisitions. 
3.1 Data sources and sample selection 
The initial list of M&As was obtained from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database. We 
analyze the performance of US acquisitions that were announced and completed (Item STAT) 
between January 1989 and December 2003.6 We then proceed by applying the following filters to 
the sample: 
                                                
5  While some studies such as Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) clearly 
distinguish between the agency motive and the hubris motive, this paper does not so. Indeed, the focus of this 
paper is different. Rather than explaining the link between total gains and target shareholder gains (which is 
different depending on which of the two  motives that applies), the focus here is on explaining the link between 
stock performance and accounting profits (which is the same for either motive). 
6  Transactions have to be completed by December 31st, 2003 as  we require  accounting data for at least three years 
following the year of the completion. 
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1. We retain only those mergers where the share of the acquirer in the target firm’s equity 
was below 50% before and above 50% after the transaction (Items PHDA and 
A_POSTMERGEOWN_PCT). Alternatively, the acquirer had to buy 50% of the shares 
outstanding during the merger process (Item PC TOWN).  
2. Morck et al. (1990) argue that the inclusion of small transactions can bias the 
measurement of performance. Therefore, we only include those mergers whose absolute 
transaction value (Item VAL) is at least US$ 50 million (Item VAL). This is in line with 
Harford (2005) who also excludes small mergers. 
3. The acquirer and the target firm are both US corporations and the acquirer must be listed 
on a US stock exchange. We exclude international (Item MATYPE IMA) and overseas 
mergers (Item MATYPE OMA). 
4. We exclude mergers involving banks or insurance companies as their accounting figures 
(e.g. cash flow) are not directly comparable to those of firms from other ind ustries. 
5. For the firms to be included in our final sample stock price and accounting data must be 
available in CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) or alternatively in 
COMPUSTAT for the three years before and after the merger. Furthermore, informa tion 
on the method of payment of the acquirer must be available from the SDC database. 
6. All acquisitions must have IBES Earnings Consensus data for the pre- and post- 
acquisition period. 
7. All acquisitions must have a value for the Gompers et al. (2003) index which measures 
shareholder rights restrictions. 
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This selection process results in a final sample of 927 acquisitions. 
3.2 Measurement of the bidder’s accounting performance 
In line with Healey et al. (1992) and Ghosh (2001), we measure accounting performance by the 
ratio of operating cash flow to the book value of assets. The operating cash flow is defined as 
sales (CRSP Item 12) minus the cost of goods sold (Item 41) minus selling and administrative 
expenses (Item 189) plus depreciation and goodwill amortization expenses (Item 196). The 
operating cash flow is then divided by the book value of assets measured at the end of the 
previous year. We scale operating cash flow by the book value of total assets (Item 6) rather than 
the market value of assets in the post-acquisition period as the latter would bias the ratio 
downwards (see Agrawal et al. (1992) and Ghosh (2001)).7  
We compare the pre- and post-acquisition performance of the acquirer with the performance of 
two different  portfolios of matched firms. The procedure closely follows Barber and Lyon (1996) 
who also use the portfolio approach and to a lesser extent Ghosh (2001) who uses the matched 
firm approach. The first portfolio consists of all the firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the 
acquirer and of a similar size (same quintile of book value of total assets for the last available 
year before the merger announcement as the acquirer) and pre-event performance (same quintile 
of operating cash flow ratio (return on assets) for the last available year before the merger 
announcement as the acquirer). The second portfolio of matched firms consists of all the firms 
                                                
7  Using the market value of assets as the denominator would lead to an increase in the cash flow ratio – even in 
the absence of any change in cash flow – given the observed decrease in market value during the three to five 
years following the acquisition (see Agrawal et al. (1992)). However, in turn, using the book value rather than 
the market value may create another potential bias. Indeed, firms have a choice between the purchase and 
pooling of interests method to account for their acquisitions. While the former method results in reporting the 
fair value of the acquisition in the bidder’s accounts (and amortizing this value over time), the latter consists of 
reporting the net book value of the acquisition. Hence, an acquirer would end up with a very different book 
value of assets depending on what method it would be using to account for the acquisition. However, Hopkins et 
al. (2000) report that most firms go to great length to avoid the pooling me thod. Hence, we feel that the bias 
from using the book value of assets is likely to be much smaller compared to that from using the market value. 
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with a different two-digit SIC code than that of the acquirer, but of a similar size (same quintile of 
book value of total assets for the last year available before the merger announcement as the 
acquirer) and pre-event performance (same quintile of operating cash flow ratio (return on assets) 
for the last year available before the merger announcement as the acquirer).  
Importantly, both of our peer groups or portfolios are matched by performance. Indeed, Barber 
and Lyon (1996) show that when the sample firms experience above-average pre-event 
performance, it is important to match the peer firms by pre-event performance. This is likely to 
be an issue for our sample. Indeed, the studies in Table II suggest that there is a clear trend in 
accounting performance across the period before the acquisition and the period following the 
acquisition. Table III investigates this issue in detail. The table reports the mean and median cash 
flow ratios for the bidders for each of the three years before and after the acquisition. 
Furthermore, the table also reports the mean and median differences between each bidder’s cash 
flow ratio and that for the portfolio of industry peers (the industry-matched portfolio). Finally, we 
also compute the mean and median for the equivalent difference based on the portfolio of non-
industry peers (the size-matched portfolio). The table shows that there is a drop in the cash flow 
ratio after the merger. This is the case for all three measures. Our results are similar to those of 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and those of Dickerson et al. (1997) who find a similar drop in 
industry-adjusted performance of about 2%. The industry as well as the non- industry adjusted 
performance is significantly negative in all the years subsequent to the completion of the merger, 
but significantly positive in most of the years in the pre-merger period. These patterns suggest 
that it is important to select the peer firms by matching them by pre-event performance with the 
sample firms. 
[Table III about here] 
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3.3 Measurement of the bidder’s stock returns at the announcement 
We measure the short-term abnormal stock price performance of the acquirer by calculating the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) based on the event study methodology. The tables in the 
paper are based on the [-10;+10] and [-2;+2] windows with day 0 being the announcement day of 
the acquisition. In addition, we have checked the robustness of our results using various other 
window lengths. The daily abnormal returns are defined as follows: 
i,t i,t i i m,tAR R Ré ù= - a + bë û  
where Ri,t and Rm,t  denote the return on stock i and the market, respectively, on day t. The 
parameters ai and ßi are the intercept and slope estimates, respectively, obtained from the market-
model regression. The estimation window for this regression is based on the 255 trading days 
preceding day -41. The CRSP value-weighted performance index, which is a broad index, is used 
as the proxy for the market portfolio.  
We measure the average cross-sectional cumulative abnormal returns as follows: 
T n
,T i,t
t i 1
1 1CAR AR
T nt =t =
é ù= ê ú- t ë û
å å  
where t is the first day of the window (e.g. day -10), T is the last day of the window (e.g. day 
+10) and n is the number of acquisitions. 
3.4 Methodologies and factors used to predict the occurrence of each the four types of 
acquisitions 
As previously stated, the main aim of this paper is to test whether the factors advanced by the 
theories reviewed in the previous section are able to explain the occurrence of the four different 
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combinations of abnormal stock returns and accounting performance (see Figure I) which we 
have labeled Type I, Type II, Type III and Type IV acquisitions. We apply two different sets of 
tests. We start with basic univariate tests. First, based on the signs of the CARs and abnormal 
accounting performance (measured by the difference between the average ratio of non-industry 
adjusted operating cash flow to the book value of assets and the equivalent average for the three 
years preceding announcement year), we categorize each acquisition according to the four types 
as specified in Figure I. Second, we then investigate whether each type can be explained by the 
motives suggested in Section 2. 
As hypothesized in Section 2, Type I acquisitions, i.e. those characterized by positive CARs and 
positive abnormal accounting performance, are driven by synergies. Similar to Brous and Kini 
(1993) and Sudarsanam et al. (2002), we argue that earnings forecasts and their revision shortly 
after the takeover announcement provide information on the increase in the bidder’s value due to 
the acquisition. We expect a positive revision of earnings forecasts in the month following the 
acquisition for bidders in Type I acquisitions, reflecting the creation of future synergies. In detail, 
the variable “analysts’ revision mean (median)” is defined as the ratio of the difference between 
the earnings consensus mean (median) post-acquisition and the consensus mean (median) pre-
acquisition divided by the consensus mean (median) pre-acquisition. Earnings forecasts are for 
the year following the year of the acquisition announcement. The pre-acquisition period is the 
quarter preceding the quarter with the acquisition announcement and the post-acquisition period 
is the quarter following the announcement. We also use an alternative variable, a dummy variable 
which is set to one if a majority of the financial analysts that follow the bidder make an upward 
revision in the quarter following the announcement of the acquisition. Finally, we also expect 
Type I bidders to have relatively low valuations reflecting the need for exploiting synergies and 
to use relatively less stock and more cash to pay for the target.  
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Type II acquisitions  are those acquisitions that are characterized by positive acquirer CARs and 
negative abnormal accounting performance. As hypothesized in Section 2, these acquisitions are 
motivated by the desire to preempt competitors in the same industry from acquiring the target, 
thereby avoiding the negative externalities from being an outsider to the acquisition (Fridolfsson 
and Stennek (2005)). We expect that Type II acquisitions are characterized by a negative industry 
announcement effect reflecting the negative externalities to the industry (i.e. to the outsiders to 
the merger). The industry announcement effect is defined as the median abnormal return of the 
acquirer’s industry over the event window (we employ a range of different window lengths) 
centered on the announcement day of the acquisition. The industry classification is based on the 
two-digit SIC codes.  
Type III acquisitions have negative abnormal stock returns, but positive abnormal accounting 
performance. According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), these acquisitions are made by bidders 
who believe that their stock is overvalued and intend to soften the future decrease in their stock 
price by taking over other firms, paying for the acquisitions with their overvalued stock and by 
benefiting from the creation of synergies (hence the improvement in accounting performance). 
We expect that bidders in Type III acquisitions have a high Tobin’s Q, a low book-to-market 
ratio, a high price-earnings ratio and use mainly stock to pay for the target.  
Finally, Type IV acquisitions are those generating negative CARs and negative abnormal 
accounting performance. These are the acquisitions that are predicted to be made by bidders with 
weak corporate governance. In other words, these are the acquisitions that destroy rather than 
create shareholder value. We use the corporate governance index from Gompers et al. (2003) to 
measure the quality of governance of the bidder. The index, which has a possible range of 0 to 
24, is incremented by one for the presence of each of 24 possible provisions that restrict 
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shareholder rights. These provisions give the management power to act in their own interest 
rather than maximizing shareholder value. Such provisions make it more difficult for 
shareholders to sue or replace a director, to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting etc. (see 
Gompers et al., p.8). As an alternative, we use the Dictatorship Index, which is set to the actual 
value for the corporate governance index for acquirers with an index value of at least 14, and set 
to zero otherwise. Gompers et al. (2003) refer to these firms as management dictatorships: these 
are firms whose managers have virtually uncontested power and shareholders face strong 
restrictions in terms of contesting the decisions of the former and replacing them. Finally, we use 
the Bebchuk et al. (2009) Entrenchment Index as a further alternative. The index is incremented 
by one for each of four possible provisions (the so called ‘constitutional provisions’) that limit 
shareholder voting power and two possible provisions that prevent hostile takeovers (the so called 
‘takeover readiness’). The index is measured for all firms without dual-class stock followed by 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). While the general Gompers et al. index 
reflects a multitude of corporate governance issues, we expect that the Dictatorship Index and the 
Entrenchment Index are much better at measuring the corporate governance provisions that may 
lead to the motive behind Type IV acquisitions, i.e. empire building.  
In addition to the univariate tests, we also run binomial logistic regressions (logits) to predict, 
based on the above explanatory variables, the probability of a given acquisition to be within one 
of the four types as defined in Figure I. 
The definitions for all the  variables used in this study are reported in Table IV and the correlation 
matrix for all the independent variables can be found in Table A.I in the Appendix. 
[Table IV about here] 
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4. Empirical results 
The aim of the empirical section is to test whether each of the four types of acquisitions which 
can have very different outcomes in terms of abnormal stock returns and accounting performance 
can be explained by the distinct motives underlying each type. As stated in the introduction, the 
focus of the analysis is on explaining these often a priori contradictory outcomes and not on the 
motives themselves. The section starts with a univariate analysis and then moves onto a more 
involved multivariate analysis based on logistic regressions to test whether the motives advanced 
in Section 2 to explain each the four types of acquisitions are indeed valid. 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
In the tables that follow we focus on the non- industry adjusted operating cash flow when 
measuring accounting performance. In detail, the accounting performance of each bidder is 
adjusted by its peer group’s performance. The peer group consists of all the firms with a different 
two-digit SIC code than the acquirer, but of a similar size and pre-event performance. Accounting 
performance is measured as the difference between the bidder’s average accounting performance 
across the three years following the year of the announcement and the average accounting 
performance across the three years preceding that year minus the corresponding difference for the 
matched portfolio. In other words, accounting performance measures the possible improvement 
in performance from the three-year period before the acquisition to the three-year period after the 
acquisition, adjusting for the equivalent improvement in performance for the peer group. 
Table V and Table VI report the descriptive statistics for the four types of acquisitions as well as 
the whole sample based on the CARs measured over the [-2;+2] window and the [-10;+10] 
window, respectively. Table V shows that Type I acquisitions are paid for mainly by cash as the 
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average and median percentages of cash payment are about 59% and 87%, respectively. Both 
percentages are significantly higher, at the 10% and 1% level, respectively, than the sample mean 
and median. In line with this observation, the average percentage of stock payment and the 
proportion of acquisitions paid for mainly by stock are significantly lower than the equivalent 
figures for the whole sample. Further, all of the averages for the valuation ratios, except for the 
price-earnings ratio (PE ratio), suggest that bidders involved in Type I acquisitions have 
significantly lower valuations. This is the case for the unadjusted valuation ratios as well as those 
adjusted by the industry or market median. Additional support for this pattern is provided by the 
median book-to-market ratio (BtM) and the median market-adjusted book-to-market ratio. As 
expected, analysts revise the earnings forecasts for the year following the takeover announcement 
they made in the month preceding the earnings forecast significantly upwards in the quarter 
following the takeover announcement. Both the mean and median revisions are significantly 
higher at the 1% level than the equivalent sample statistics. Further, there are significantly more 
upward than downward revisions (at the 1% level of confidence) by financial analysts for Type I 
acquisitions compared to the whole sample. In addition, Type I acquisitions generate highly 
significant and  positive industry announcement effects. Finally, the targets of Type I acquisitions 
have weaker corporate governance as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003) index (the higher 
the index value, the higher is the number of shareholder-right restrictions) than the average target. 
To summarize, Type I acquisitions are conducted by bidders with low valuations and few 
investment opportunities. They generate upward revisions of analysts’ forecasts as well as 
positive industry announcement effects. In addition, the targets’ quality of corporate governance 
is below average. The empirical evidence so far strongly supports our hypothesis that Type I 
acquisitions are conducted in order to  generate synergies. This motive is in line with the use of 
mainly cash as a means of payment for the targets, the below-average valuation and growth 
 17 
opportunities of the bidders, the positive industry announcement effect and the weak corporate 
governance of the targets. In other words, Type I synergies seem to be driven by synergies 
including those relating to the improvement of the governance of the targets. Table VI which 
categorizes acquisitions into four types based on the longer window of [-10;+10] for the CARs 
finds similar patterns. 
[Table V about here] 
 [Table VI about here] 
Type II acquisitions are the first type characterized by a difference in signs between the abnormal 
stock return (which is positive) and the abnormal accounting performance (which is negative). In 
Section 2, we argued that this type is driven by preemption.  Table V shows that this type, similar 
to Type I, is characterized by a higher median percentage of cash payment, a lower average 
percentage of stock payment and to a lesser extent undervaluation as measured by the 
significantly higher raw and market-adjusted BtM. Type II acquisitions also exhibit significantly 
more downward than upward revisions compared to the sample as a whole. Finally, as 
hypothesized, Type II acquisitions generate significantly negative average industry 
announcement effects giving further support to the preemption motive. Table VI finds similar 
patterns in terms of the higher use of cash as a payment, the relative number of analysts’  
downward revisions and the negative industry announcement return.  
Type III acquisitions have negative abnormal stock returns, but positive abnormal accounting 
performance. In line with the overvaluation motive, the main characteristic of Type III 
acquisitions that emerges from both Table V and Table VI is that they have relatively high 
valuations. All of the various valuation ratios have at least one of the two statistics – the average 
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and /or median – which is significantly different from the equivalent sample statistic. The 
overvaluation of the bidder is also in line with the significantly higher (lower) use of stock (cash) 
payment. In Table V, the average analysts’ revision mean and median are significantly lower than 
the equivalent statistics for the whole sample. However, the median values are significantly 
higher than the equivalent sample statistics. Conversely, the Type III averages for the analysts’ 
revisions are no longer significantly different from the sample means in Table VI whereas the 
medians remain significantly higher (at the 5% level).  
Finally, Type IV acquisitions use significantly less cash payment (the median percentage of cash 
payment is significant in both Table V and Table VI) than the sample as a whole. They also have 
significantly higher median raw and adjusted Tobin’s Q ratios. However, the overvaluation is less 
extreme than for Type III acquisitions and is only suggested by the Tobin’s Q ratios, but not any 
of the other valuation ratios. Further, the averages for the analysts’ revision mean and medians 
are significantly lower. Similar to Type II acquisitions and in line with the negative abnormal 
accounting performance after the acquisition, there are significantly more downward than upward 
revisions by financial analysts for Type IV acquisitions (at the 5% level). The median industry 
announcement effect is significantly negative. Finally, Table VI also suggests that bidders in 
Type IV acquisitions have significantly worse corporate governance as measured by Bebchuk et 
al.’s (2009) entrenchment index. The average index value is significantly different from the 
equivalent sample statistic at the 5% level of confidence. To summarize, there is evidence of 
weaker corporate governance for Type IV bidders as compared to bidders undertaking any of the 
other three types of acquisitions which is in line with our hypothesis. 
Crucially, a characteristic of Type IV acquisitions is that, similar to (but to a lesser extent than) 
Type III acquisitions, bidders have higher median valuations than the sample as a whole. This 
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then leads us back to the assumption we made when justifying Type III acquisitions in Section 2: 
we assumed that Type III acquirers act in the interests of their existing shareholders when 
financing their acquisitions with their overvalued stock. Clearly both Type III and Type IV 
acquirers are overvalued. So, do Type III bidders have better corporate governance than Type IV 
bidders? The figures from Table V and Table VI suggest that this is indeed the case. Both the 
Dictatorship Index and the Entrenchment Index are significantly lower for Type III bidders, 
suggesting significantly better corporate governance, compared to Type IV bidders (not reported 
in a table). In detail, the Dictatorship Index is significantly lower for Type III than for Type IV at 
the 1% (10%) level of significance in Table V (Table VI). The Entrenchment Index is also 
significantly lower at the 10% (1%) level of significance in Table V (Table VI). Hence, while 
(some) of the Type IV acquisitions are also carried out for the same overvaluation motive as 
Type III acquisitions, there is a clear distinction between both types of bidders. Type III acquirers 
have better corporate governance than Type IV acquirers. 
4.2 Multivariate tests 
Tables VII to X report the results for the binomial regressions. Each table refers to the logistic 
regressions predicting a particular type of acquisition and presents first the regressions based on 
the acquisition type classification using the [-2;+2] window for the CARs and then those based 
on the [-10;+10] window. The dependent variable is equal to one for acquisitions of the type 
under consideration, and set to zero otherwise. Each set of regressions contains only those factors 
that have been identified in Section 2 as the main drivers for that particular type of acquisition. 
For example, for Type II (the preemptive acquisitions) this is the industry announcement effect 
whereas for Type III (the overvaluation motive) it is company valuation. In turn, each regression 
in a given set contains an alternative proxy for the key factor if more than one proxy is available. 
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For example, Model 9 and Model 10 which are part of the set of regress ions for Type III contain 
the logarithm of the market-adjusted Tobin’s Q and the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, 
respectively.  Although as a robustness check we later on include all the variables at once in the 
logistic regressions, at this stage we feel that it is advisable to include only the key variables to 
avoid problems of multicollinearity. Indeed, Aguilera, Escabias and Valderrama (2006), Hosmer 
and Lemeshow (1989) and Ryan (1997), among others, argue that contrary to OLS regressions  
logistic regressions become highly unstable when there is strong multicollinearity.  
Table VII suggests that Type I acquisitions are indeed driven by synergies. In line with our 
hypothesis, an acquisition is more likely to be of Type I if its announcement generates more 
upward than downward revisions by financial analysts (Model 1) and the analysts’ revision mean 
(Model 2) and median (Model 3) are positive. The coefficients on all three variables are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. To sum up, there is strong evidence that those 
acquisitions with analyst upward revisions for the target in the month following the 
announcement of the acquisition are more likely to be Type I acquisitions. Similar to what the 
univariate tests suggest, acquisitions involving a majority of cash payment and a minority of 
stock payment are also more likely to be of Type I. The results based on the CARs for the longer 
window of [-10;+10] in order to typify the acquisitions largely confirm the above patterns. Again, 
acquisitions have a higher probability of being of Type I if the target’s mean (Model 2) and 
median earnings forecast (Model 3) are revised upward in the month following the announcement 
of the acquisition.  
[Table VII about here] 
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As hypothesized, Table VIII shows that acquisitions are more likely to be of Type II, i.e. 
motivated by preemption, if they are accompanied by a negative industry announcement effect 
(Model 6). The results are qualitatively identical for both sets of regressions. 
[Table VIII about here] 
Type III acquisitions are those motivated by the overvaluation of the bidder’s stock. We expect 
that these acquisitions are associated with a majority of stock payment and high valuation ratios. 
Models 7 to 12 in Table IX show that this is indeed the case. Starting with the regressions based 
on the CARs for the shorter window of [-2;+2], Model 7 suggests that acquisitions using a 
majority of stock payment are more likely to be of Type III, i.e. are more likely to be 
characterized by a positive abnormal stock return and negative abnormal accounting 
performance. In line with this pattern, Model 8 shows that acquisitions involving a majority of 
cash payment are less likely to be of Type III. Models 9 to 12 contain each a different valuation 
ratio: the logarithm of the market-adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio, the logarithm of the industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q ratio, the logarithm of the market-adjusted BtM ratio and the price-earnings ratio. 
Except for the latter which is not significant, each of the different valuation ratios suggests that 
acquirers with higher valuations are more likely to carry out Type III acquisitions. In line with the 
results from the regressions based on the CARs for the shorter window, an acquisition is more 
(less) likely to be of Type III if it is mainly paid for with stock and less likely if it is mainly paid 
for with cash (Models 7 and 8). Finally, it is more likely to be of Type III if it has a lower BtM 
ratio (Model 11). All these results provide strong support for our hypothesis that Type III 
acquisitions can be explained by the overvaluation of the bidder’s stock. 
[Table IX about here] 
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Type IV acquisitions are those driven by the weak corporate governance of the bidder and are 
value-destroying transactions characterized by both negative abnormal stock returns and 
accounting performance. Table X shows that, similar to the univariate tests, the corporate 
governance index (Model 14) is not significant whereas the Dictatorship Index (Model 13) is 
significantly positive. These results suggest that acquirers whose managers have virtually 
uncontested power are more likely to engage in Type IV acquisitions. In line with these results, 
bidders with a higher value for the Bebchuk et al. (2009) Entrenchment Index (Models 15 and 16) 
are more likely to engage in Type IV acquisitions (the coefficient is significant at the 10% level 
of significance). Finally, also in line with our expectations, targets experiencing negative analyst 
revisions in the month following the announcement are more likely to be involved in Type IV 
acquisitions. Again, the results are upheld when the acquisitions are classified into types based on 
the [-10;+10] window and tend to be even more significant.  
[Table X about here] 
To sum up, Tables VII to X provide strong evidence that the various types of acquisitions, 
characterized by particular combinations of positive or negative excess stock returns and 
accounting performance, are driven by very distinct motives. Hence, rather than being caused by 
differences in perspectives and/or measurement errors, the a priori conflicting combinations of 
stock returns and accounting performance (for Types II and III) can be rationalized by the 
particular motives underlying these acquisitions. 
4.3 Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our results, we recalculate the CARs using market-adjusted rather 
than the returns from the market model. Market adjustment has two advantages, both of which 
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are related to the fact that an estimation window prior to the event window is not required. The 
first advantage is that there is no potential contamination of the estimation window such as via 
the occurrence of other acquisition announcements. The second advantage is that the potential 
problem of infrequent or thin trading during the estimation window, and the resulting bias in the 
estimated beta, are no longer an issue . However, the results from the  index adjustment are very 
similar to those obtained from using the market model adjustment and they are not reported in 
tabular form.  
We also checked whether clustering, i.e. multiple acquisitions carried out by the same bidder, 
affect our result. Indeed, some types of acquisitions are more likely to appear in clusters than 
others. For example, this may be the case of Type IV acquisitions as a single bidder pursuing an 
empire building strategy may buy up a series of targets within fairly quick succession. Type II 
acquisitions (preemption) are also more likely to be clustered as one firm may preempt its rivals 
from acquiring a whole series of potential targets with a short amount of time. We removed 
acquisitions made by the same acquirer within the estimation period and the event period. Our 
earlier results were upheld. 
Further, we investigate whether the targets in Type III acquisitions are undervalued relative to 
their acquirers (the regressions are not reported in tabular form). In other words, it may very well 
be the case that Type III acquisitions are carried out by bidders that are overvalued in relative 
rather than absolute terms. By allowing for bidders to be overvalued relative to their targets, we 
do not only cover bidders that are overvalued in absolute terms, but we also cover those that 
acquire undervalued targets. We measure relative overvaluation of the bidder (relative 
undervaluation of the target) as the industry-adjusted Q or BtM ratio  of the target relative to the 
industry-adjusted Q or BtM ratio  of the acquirer. We find that on average Type III bidders have 
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significantly higher valuations than their targets. This result is in line with Ang and Cheng 
(2006). Their empirical test of the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model shows that overvalued 
bidders manage to dampen their future share price decline as long as they are more overvalued 
than their targets. 
We also investigate whether the targets in Type IV acquisitions are overvalued relative to the 
acquirers (the regressions are not reported in a table). Our empirical findings show that the 
valuation of Type IV bidders compared to their targets is lower; the coefficient on the 
undervaluation proxy just falls short of being significant at the 10% level. This provides 
additional support for our hypothesis that Type IV acquisitions are driven by agency 
considerations. 
While the binomial logit regressions in Tables VII to X contain only those factors that are 
expected to drive each particular type of acquisition, some may accuse this method of amounting 
to data snooping or being subject to confirmatory bias.8 Hence, as a robustness check, for each 
type of acquisition we also run logits that include all the explanatory variables at once. For each 
type of acquisition, the dependent variable is defined in the same way as in the corresponding 
regression(s) in Tables VII to X. As in the previous binomial logits, the dependent variable takes 
on the value of one if a particular acquisition is characterized by the combination of abnormal 
stock returns and accounting performance under consideration (the so-called type) and is set to 
zero otherwise. Some of these regressions are reported in Tables XI and XII. The former table 
                                                
8 While this alternative methodology deals with the potential issue of data snooping, it also has a potentially non-
negligible shortcoming. Indeed, as logits are fairly sensitive to multicollinearity compared to OLS regressions (see 
Aguilera, Escabias and Valderrama (2006)), the introduction of additional variables may cause more harm than good. 
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classifies acquisitions into the four types based on CARs for the [-2;+2] window whereas the 
latter table is based on the [-10;+10] window.  
[Table XI about here] 
[Table XII about here] 
The regressions reported in Tables XI and XII, as well as those not reported, largely confirm the 
results from Tables VII to X. Indeed, an acquisition is more likely to be of Type I, if there is a 
positive analyst revision of the bidder’s earnings in the month following the announcement. The 
synergies motive behind Type I acquisitions also fits with the significantly negative coefficient 
on the majority stock payment dummy. The significantly positive coefficient on the industry 
announcement effect also makes sense as it may signal further consolidation and potential for 
synergies within the industry. Similar to the previous tables, those acquisitions with negative 
industry announcement effects are more likely to be of Type II. As previously observed, the 
coefficient on the industry announcement effect is significantly negative in the regression based 
on the [-2;+2] window and in that based on the [-10;+10] window. The logit regression for Type 
III acquisitions in Table XI confirms the previous results suggesting that these acquisitions are 
driven by the overvaluation of the bidder’s stock. Indeed, the coefficient on the logarithm of the 
BtM ratio is significantly negative, suggesting that highly valued bidders are more likely to 
engage in Type III acquisitions. The significantly positive coefficient on the majority stock 
payment dummy provides further support for the overvaluation motive behind Type III 
acquisitions. Finally, also in line with our previous results, an acquisition is more likely to be of 
Type IV if the bidder suffers from bad corporate governance. The significantly negative 
coefficient on the analysts’ revision mean fits with the reduction in the corporate governance 
quality that the target will be subject to. While previously there was evidence of overvaluation for 
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Type IV bidders, albeit not to the same extent as for Type III bidders, there is no longer evidence 
of such overvaluation in the logit regressions in Tables XI and XII. 
To sum up Tables XI and XII, the inclusion in the regressions of all the key variables for the four 
types of acquisitions brings about similar results to those obtained from the regressions including 
only the variables expected to be relevant to the particular type of acquisition under 
consideration. 
While Type I, II and III acquisitions are not affected by agency problems, the main motivation 
for Type IV acquisitions is agency problems between the management of the acquirer and its 
shareholders. Hence, the first three types are clearly not independent. We account for this 
dependence by estimating a nested logit. The nested logit model relaxes the key assumption of 
binary logit models of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (Manski and McFadden 1981).  
Acquisitions are classed into two groups: Group I with the acquisitions  not affected by agency 
problems (Types I-III) and Group II with those  affected by agency problems (Type IV). At the 
top of the tree for the nested logit, the dictatorship index captures how strong acquisitions might 
be affected by agency problems. At the bottom of the tree,  we investigate the different 
motivations for the various merger types within Group I by using the same explanatory variables 
as in the logit models in Tables XI and XII. The untabulated results for the first stage of our 
nested logit model exhibit a significantly positive coefficient (at the 5% level both for the [-2;+2] 
window and the [-10;+10] window) on the dictatorship index. This suggests that firms with a 
higher dictatorship index are more likely to engage in Type IV acquisitions. The results for the 
bottom of the tree for the nested logit model (with Type IV acquisitions as the base case) are 
qualitatively similar to those of the binary logit models reported in Tables XI and XII. In 
particular, our results that Type I acquisitions are driven by synergies (measured by the acquirer’s 
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average analysts’ earnings revision)  are confirmed. Furthermore, there is also confirmation of our 
earlier results that acquisitions are more likely to be of Type II (motivated by preemption) if they 
are accompanied by a negative industry announcement effect. Finally as previously found, 
acquisitions are more likely to be of Type III if the bidder’s stock is relatively overvalued 
(measured by the acquirer’s book to market ratio). 
Finally, some types of acquisitions are more likely to occur during certain periods and/or within 
certain industries. A strong candidate for clustering across time and industry are Type III 
acquisitions which are driven by the overvaluation of the bidder. Other possible candidates are 
synergistic acquisitions (Type I) and preemptive acquisitions (Type II).9 We reran the regressions 
from Tables VII and VIII by including a) industry and time dummies and b) including the former 
as well as interaction terms between the two. The results from these regressions confirm our 
previous results. 
5. Conclusion 
Studies measuring the gains from acquisitions tend to find contradictory results depending on the 
methodology they use. Indeed, whereas studies using event-study methodology find slightly 
positive combined cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), those using accounting performance 
report earnings losses after the acquisition. While the two types of studies disagree as to the 
average overall gains from acquisitions, they also typically disagree as to the wealth effects 
generated by individual acquisitions. Hence, for individual acquisitions it is feasible to observe 
one of the four possible combinations between positive or negative CARs and excess accounting 
performance. In particular, we distinguish between Type I (positive CARs and positive abnormal 
                                                
9  See e.g. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) for the link between merger waves and industry shocks. 
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accounting performance), Type II (positive CARs and negative abnormal accounting 
performance), Type III (negative CARs and positive abnormal accounting performance) and 
Type IV (negative CARs and abnormal accounting performance) acquisitions. This paper 
attempts to explain the occurrence of each type by a particular motive advanced by theory.   
In detail, we hypothesize that Type I acquisitions are motivated by the exploitation of synergies, 
whereas Type II, Type III and Type IV acquisitions are motivated by preemption (Fridolfsson 
and Stennek (2005)), the overvaluation of the bidder’s stock and market timing (Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003)) and bad corporate governance, respectively. Based on a sample of more than 900 
US acquisitions during 1989 and 2003, we find strong evidence that each of the four different 
types of performance can be explained by a distinct motive. This paper has therefore important 
implications for studies investigating the gains from acquisitions accruing to the bidders. Indeed, 
it suggests that it is crucial to take into account the motive behind each acquisition when 
measuring the wealth gains for the bidders. In other words, failing to adjust correctly for the 
motives behind an acquisition may lead to contradictory conclusions as to its gains and these will 
depend on the measure of performance used. Acquisitions carried for the motives of preempting 
rivals and benefiting from overvalued stock are such prime candidates. 
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Figure I: Possible outcomes of stock and accounting performance following acquisitions  
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Table I: Summary of previous event studies on the wealth effects of M&As 
This table shows the event studies that estimate shareholder wealth effects of mergers in the short and long run. Panel A shows 
the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the shareholders of the acquirer, the target and the combined firm from the 
short-run event studies. Panel B exhibits the CARs to acquirers found by the long-run event studies . ** and * stand for 
significance at the 5% level or better and significance at the 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Short run event studies 
Study Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event 
window 
Acquirer 
CARs 
Target 
CARs 
Combined 
CARs 
Asquith et al. (1987) 343 1973 – 83 (-1,±0) -0.85%** - - 
Varaiya and Ferris (1987) 96 1974 – 83 (-1,±0) -2.15%** - - 
Bradley et al. (1988) 236 1963- 84 (- 5,+5) +1%** +31.77%** +7.43%** 
Lang et al. (1989) 87 1968 -  86 (- 5,+5) +0.00% +40.30%** +11.30%** 
Servaes (1991) 704 1972- 87 (- 1,close) - 1.07%** +23.64% +3.66% 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) 128 1980 - 87 (-1,±0) - 1.2%** - - 
Healy et al. (1992) 50 1979 -  84 (- 5,+5) - 2.20% +45.60%** +9.10%** 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) 209 1971 -  82 (- 5,+5) -1.49%** +3.74%** +3.74%** 
Smith and Kim (1994) 177 1980 -  86 (- 5,+5) +0.50% +30.19%** +8.88%** 
   (- 1,±0) - 0.23% +15.84%** +3.79%** 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) 281 1990 -  99 (- 1,+1) - 0.37% +21.2%** +3.56%** 
Andrade et al. (2001) 3,688 1973 -  98 (- 1,+1) - 0.70% +16.00%** +1.80%** 
   (- 20, close) - 3.80% +23.80%** +1.90% 
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Table I cont’d 
Panel B: Long run event studies (Long term returns to acquirers)  
Study Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event window CARs 
(mergers) 
CARs (tender 
offers) 
CAR 
(combined) 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) 534 1970 – 89 (1,1250 days) - 14.2%** +61.3%** 0.1% 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 4,316 1980- 91 (0,36) - 4%** +9%** - 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 2,068 1961-1993 (0,36) -1% - - 
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Table II: Summary of previous accounting studies on the wealth effects of M&As 
This table shows the studies that estimate shareholder wealth effects of mergers via accounting studies. We 
show the average abnormal cash flow returns of the combined firms using the particular cash flow measure. 
** and * stand for significance at the 5% level or better and significance at the 10% level, respectively. 
Study Dataset and performance measure used 
 
Results 
 
Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1989) 
 
471 transactions between 1950 and 
1970,  the ratio of operating income  to 
total assets  
-2.00%** 
 
Healy et al. (1992) 50 largest US mergers between 1979 
and 1984, the ratio of industry-
adjusted operating cash flows to total 
assets 
+2.8%** 
 
Dickerson et al. 
(1997) 
 
613 transactions between 1948 and 
1977, return on assets 
-2.00% 
 
Ghosh (2001) 315 transactions between 1981 and 
1995, the ratio of industry-adjusted 
cash flows to total assets 
+0.66% 
Ramaswamy and 
Waegelein (2003) 
 
162 transactions between 1975 and 
1990, the ratio of industry-adjusted 
operating cash flows to total assets 
+0.127 for whole sample. 
Significantly positive between 
1975 and 1982. Thereafter, 
insignificant 
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Table III: Pre- and post-merger cash flow ratio  
This table presents the acquirer’s mean and median operating cash flow ratio for the whole sample. The 
cash flow is defined as sales (CRSP Item 12) minus the cost of goods sold (Item 41) minus selling and 
administrative expenses (Item 189) plus depreciation and goodwill (Item 196).Total assets are measured 
at the end of the fiscal year preceding the merger. The table dis plays the mean and median values for 
each of the three years before and after the merger. Columns two and three show the acquirer’s raw cash 
flow return. Columns four to seven display the abnormal cash flow returns of the merging firms 
compared to the industry peer group and the non-industry peer group, respectively. ***  and ** stand for 
statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, for the two -tailed test that the return is 
different from zero. 
  Cash flow return 
Abnormal cash flow return 
(industry peer group) 
Abnormal cash flow return 
(non-industry peer group) 
Year relative 
to 
transaction 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
-3 42.10%***  40.27% *** 1.40%** 0.35% *** 0.91%** -0.02% 
-2 41.80%***  41.65% *** 0.79%** 0.68% ** 0.55% -0.37% 
-1 40.90%***  39.57% *** 0.11% -0.23% -0.38% -0.68% *** 
1 36.53%***  34.73% *** -3.50%*** -3.30% *** -5.08%*** -4.72% *** 
2 36.05%***  34.15% *** -4.76%*** -3.92% *** -5.90%*** -5.35% *** 
3 36.39%***  34.24% *** -4.72%*** -3.91% *** -5.97%*** -5.72% *** 
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Table IV: Definition of the variables 
This table contains the definitions of all the variables used in this study, except for the abnormal accounting 
performance and the abnormal stock returns which are defined in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, respectively. 
Financial data are obtained from COMPUSTAT, data on analyst forecasts are from IBES and stock price data are 
from CRSP. 
Variable Description 
% Cash Payment The share of cash expressed as a percentage of the total payment for the acquisition 
% Other Payment The share of other payment methods (Percentage of consideration paid in other then cash or 
stock: Total value minus value paid in cash and stock divided by total value; consideration 
sought: All types of consideration sought by the acquirer: common or ordinary shares (for 
public targets), options, convertible preferred shares, assets, stock (for private targets)) 
expressed as a percentage of the total payment for the acquisition 
% Stock Payment The share of stock expressed as a percentage of the total acquisition payment for the 
acquisition 
Analysts’ Revision 
Dummy  
This a dummy variable set to one if the number of analysts making an upward revision in 
the quarter following the announcement of the acquisition is larger than the number of 
analysts making a downward revision. All forecasts are for the acquiring firm in the 
financial year following the year of the acquisition announcement 
Analysts’ Revision  
Median 
The median of the ratio of (IBES Earnings Consensus Mean Post-Acquisition / closing price 
of the first trading day in the month of the forecast - IBES Consensus Mean Pre/ closing 
price of the first trading day in the month of the forecast) to IBES Consensus Mean Pre-
Acquisition / closing price of the first trading day in the month of the forecast. The pre-
acquis ition period is defined as the quarter preceding the quarter with the announcement day 
and the post-acquisition period is quarter following the announcement. All forecasts are for 
the acquiring firm in the financial year following the year of the acquisition announcement 
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Table IV cont’d 
Analysts’ Revision  
Mean 
The mean of the ratio of (IBES Earnings Consensus Mean Post-Acquisition / closing price 
of the first trading day in the month of the forecast - IBES Consensus Mean Pre / closing 
price of the first trading day in the month of the forecast) to IBES Consensus Mean Pre-
Acquisition / closing price of the first trading day in the month of the forecast. The pre- and 
post-acquisition periods are as defined above. All forecasts are for the acquiring firm in the 
financial year following the year of the acquisition announcement 
BtM The book value of equity (Item 60) at the end of the financial year before the announcement 
of the acquisition divided by the market equity of the acquirer in the month preceding the 
announcement.   
BtM-market- 
adjusted  
The BtM of the acquirer minus the median Tobin’s Q of all stocks in the CRSP universe for 
the same period 
CG Dictatorship  
Index 
The Dictatorship Index is based on the Gompers et al. (2003) index. The authors call the 
portfolio of companies with an index value of at least 14 the “dictatorship portfolio”. The 
CG Dictatorship Index is equal to the value for the CG index if it is at least 14 and zero 
otherwise 
CG Index 
 
This is the Gompers et al. (2003) index which measures shareholder restrictions in the US. 
The index is incremented by 1 for each provision that restricts shareholder rights (i.e. 
increases managerial power). The index can potentially range from 1 to 24 
CG Target 
 
This is the Gompers et al. (2003) index for the target firms which measures shareholder–
rights restrictions. The index is incremented by 1 for each provision that restricts 
shareholder rights (i.e. increases managerial power). The index can potentially range from 1 
to 24 
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Table IV cont’d 
Entrenchment  
Index 
The Entrenchment Index is based on the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. The 
index is incremented by 1 for each of 4 possible provisions that reduce shareholder voting 
power and 2 provisions that prevent hostile takeovers. The entrenchment index is measured 
for all firms without dual-class stock followed by the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) 
Industry CARs  
[-X; +X] 
The median abnormal returns of the acquirer’s industry over the [-X;+X] event window 
centered on the announcement day of the acquisition. The industry classification is based on 
the two-digit SIC codes 
Leverage Target The target’s book value of debt divided by the target’s book value of equity (Item 60) 
Ln(BtM) The natural logarithm of the acquirer’s BtM as defined above 
Ln(BtM-market- 
adjusted) 
The natural logarithm of BtM-market-adjusted   
Ln(Q-industry- 
adjusted) 
The natural logarithm of Q-industry-adjusted   
Ln(Q-market- 
adjusted) 
The natural logarithm of Q-market-adjusted 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) The natural logarithm of the acquirer’s Tobin’s Q as defined above 
Majority Cash  
Payment 
A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if at least 50.1 % of the acquisition 
payment is made by cash and is set to zero otherwise 
Majority Other  
Payment 
A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if at least 50.1 % of the acquisition 
payment is made by payment forms other than stock and cash and is set to zero otherwise 
Majority Stock  
Payment 
A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if at least 50.1 % of the acquisition 
payment is made by stock and is set to zero otherwise 
PE The price-earnings ratio of the acquirer at the end of the month preceding the announcement 
of the acquisition 
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Table IV cont’d 
Q-industry-adjusted The Tobin’s Q of the acquirer minus the median Tobin’s Q of all stocks with the same two-
digit SIC code for the same period 
Q-market-adjusted The Tobin’s Q of the acquirer minus the median Tobin’s Q of all stocks in the CRSP 
universe for the same period 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of total assets (Item 6) of the 
acquirer in the financial year before the announcement of the acquisition. As in Malmendier 
and Tate (2007), market value of assets is defined as total assets plus market value of equity 
(Item 25 times Item 199) minus book value of equity 
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Table V: Descriptive statistics – Acquisition type classification based on CARs [-2;+2] 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the four different types. An acquisition is  of Type I if both its CAR [-2; +2] and non -industry adjusted accounting performance are positive, 
of Type II if its CAR is positive and its non-industry adjusted accounting performance is negative, of Type III if its CAR is negative and its non-industry adjusted accounting 
performance is positive, and of Type IV if its CAR and non-industry adjusted accounting performance are both negative. Acquirers with negative BtM ratios and those with negative 
PE ratios are excluded. Accounting performance is measured as the difference between the average accounting performance across the three years following the year of the 
announcement and the average accounting performance across the three years preceding that year minus the corresponding difference for the matched portfolio. The variables are 
defined in Table III. We carry out a simple t-test (for the mean) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (for the median) for each variable. For the categorical variables “majority cash 
payment”, “majority other payment” and “majority stock payment”, the test statistic is a Pearson chi-square test which assumes a binomial distribution. SD stands for standard 
deviation. The null hypothesis states that the mean (median) of the respective type is equal to the mean (median) for all the four types. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 Type I Type II Type III Type IV 
 
All 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
% Cash Payment 58.88* 87.14*** 56.34 73.90*** 46.42** 30.38*** 52.07 60.34*** 53.51 66.92 
% Other Payment 9.08 0 9.89 0 6.15** 0 7.24 0 8.12 0 
% Stock Payment 32.04** 0 33.77* 0 47.43*** 41.61*** 40.70 0 38.37 0 
Majority Cash Payment 
 
0.59 1 0.55 1 0.46** 0*** 0.54 1 0.54 1 
Majority Other Payment 
 
0.26 0 0.28 0 0.23 0 0.24 0 0.25 0 
Majority Stock Payment 
 
0.31** 0 0.33* 0 0.49*** 0 0.42 0 0.39 0 
Tobin’s Q 2.32*** 1.80 2.52 1.77 2.88* 2.27*** 2.81 2.04*** 2.64 1.94 
Ln (Tobin’s Q) 0.69** 0.59 0.71* 0.57 0.89*** 0.82*** 0.83 0.71*** 0.78 0.66 
Q-Market Adjusted 
 
0.84*** 0.33 1.06 0.28 1.40* 0.75*** 1.36 0.62*** 1.17 0.50 
Q-Industry Adjusted 
 
0.73*** 0.31 0.91 0.27 1.22* 0.55*** 1.14 0.48*** 1.00 0.40 
Ln(Q-Market Adjusted) 
 
0.31*** 0.22 0.34* 0.17 0.50** 0.41*** 0.47* 0.36*** 0.40 0.28 
Ln(Q-Industry Adjusted) 
 
0.25** 0.17 0.27 0.17 0.41** 0.33*** 0.35 0.29*** 0.32 0.24 
 42 
Table V cont’d 
 Type I Type II Type III Type IV 
 
All 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
BtM 0.45** 0.36*** 0.43 0.38*** 0.34*** 0.30 0.37* 0.32 0.40 0.34 
Ln (BtM) -1.05** -1.02 -1.09 -0.97 -1.30*** -1.22*** -1.20 -1.13** -1.16 -1.07 
BtM-Market Adjusted 
 
-0.03** -0.10*** -0.05 -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.18 -0.12** -0.16 -0.08 -0.14 
Ln(BtM-Market Adjusted) 
 
-0.31** -0.24 -0.36 -0.23 -0.55** -0.48*** -0.49 -0.39** -0.43 -0.36 
PE 32.27 22.66 41.11 19.95 43.53 24.93*** 38.14 23.02 38.76 22.69 
Analysts‘ Revision Mean 
 
10.68*** 2.02*** 4.37 0.94 0.59** 1.74** 1.72*** 0.89* 4.29 1.35 
Analysts‘ Revision Median 
 
10.89*** 1.95*** 4.47 0.94 0.70** 1.76** 1.77*** 0.89* 4.40 1.34 
Analysts‘ Revision Dummy 0.43*** 0 0.28* 0 0.36 0 0.27** 0 0.34 0 
CG Index 
 
9.12 9 9.03 9 9.34 9 9.23 9 9.20 9 
Dictatorship Index 0.97 0 0.55 0 0.47 0 1.36* 0 0.86 0 
Entrenchment Index 2.13 2 2.11 2 2.05 2 2.29 2 2.15 2 
Industry CARs[-2; +2] 0.006*** 0.006***  -0.006* -0.00 0 -0.005 -0.006*** -0.004 -0.006** -0.002 -0.001 
CG Target  
 
10.96** 12 10.30 10 9.88 10 8.05*** 8*** 9.37 10 
Leverage Target  
 
1.16 0.33**  0.69 0.29** 0.46** 0.19 0.58 0.25 0.68 0.25 
Observations 221 221 240 240 211 211 255 255 927 927 
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Table VI: Descriptive statistics – Acquisition type classification based on CARs [-10;+10] 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the four different types. An acquisition is of Type I if both its CAR [-10;+10] and non-industry adjusted accounting performance are 
positive, of Type II if its CAR is positive and its non-industry adjusted accounting performance is negative, of Type III if its CAR is negative and its non-industry adjusted accounting 
performance is positive, and of Type IV if its CAR and non-industry adjusted accounting performance are both negative. Acquirers with negative BtM ratios and those with negative 
PE ratios are excluded. Accounting performance is measured as the difference between the average accounting performance across the three years following the year of the 
announcement and the average accounting performance across the three years preceding that year minus the corresponding difference for the matched portfolio. The variables are 
defined in Table III. We carry out a simple t-test (for the mean) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (for the median) for each variable. For the dummy variables “majority cash payment”, 
“majority other payment” and “majority stock payment”, the test statistic is a Pearson chi-square test which assumes a binomial distribution. SD stands for standard deviation. The 
null hypothesis states that the mean (median) of the respective type is equal to the mean (median) for all the four types. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively.  
 Type I Type II Type III Type IV 
 
All 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median 
% Cash Payment 57.01 82.52*** 56.70 77.7*** 48.13 36.29*** 51.67  60*** 53.51 66.92 
% Other Payment 8.17 0 9.01 0 7.07 0 8.06 0 8.12 0 
% Stock Payment 34.82 0 34.29 0 44.80** 16.67*** 40.27  0 38.37 0 
Majority Cash Payment 
 
0.57 1 0.56 1 0.48* 0*** 0.52 1 0.54 1 
Majority Other Payment 
 
0.25 0 0.26 0 0.24 0 0.26 0 0.25 0 
Majority Stock Payment 
 
0.34 0 0.34 0 0.46** 0 0.40 0 0.39 0 
Tobin’s Q 2.38*** 1.85*** 2.66 1.81 2.84 2.16*** 2.69 1.99*** 2.64 1.94 
Ln (Tobin’s Q) 0.72* 0.61 0.75 0.59 0.87* 0.77*** 0.80 0.69** 0.78 0.66 
Q-Market Adjusted 
 
0.89*** 0.36* 1.19 0.32 1.36 0.64*** 1.24 0.56*** 1.17 0.50 
Q-Industry Adjusted 
 
0.77** 0.33* 1.04 0.28 1.19 0.54*** 1.02 0.46*** 1.00 0.40 
Ln(Q-Market Adjusted) 0.33** 0.22 0.38 0.21 0.48** 0.37*** 0.43 0.32*** 0.40 0.28 
Ln(Q-Industry Adjusted) 0.27 0.20 0.31 0.19 0.39** 0.29*** 0.32 0.27* 0.32 0.24 
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Table VI cont’d 
 
 Type I Type II Type III Type IV 
 
All 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median 
BtM 0.44* 0.33** 0.42 0.36 0.35*** 0.30 0.38 0.34 0.40 0.34 
Ln (BtM) -1.07* -1.09 -1.12 -1.03 -1.28** -1.22*** -1.17  -1.07 -1.16 -1.07 
BtM-Market Adjusted 
 
-0.04** -0.10 -0.06 -0.11 -0.13*** -0.18 -0.11* -0.16 -0.08 -0.14 
Ln(BtM-Market Adjusted) 
 
-0.33** -0.30*** -0.39 -0.28 -0.54** -0.46*** -0.46  -0.36 -0.43 -0.36 
PE 34.32 24.38 36.58 21.79 41.74 24*** 42.41  21.46** 38.76 22.69 
Analysts‘ Revision Mean 
 
8.35 2.06*** 3.91 1.15 2.88 1.63** 2.14*** 0.74 4.29 1.35 
Analysts‘ Revision Median 
 
8.24 2.09*** 4.02 1.12 3.34 1.63** 2.17*** 0.72 4.40 1.34 
Analysts‘ Revision Dummy 0.43*** 0 0.28* 0 0.37 0 0.28*  0 0.34 0 
CG Index 
 
9.28 9 8.84 9 9.17 9 9.36 9 9.20 9 
Dictatorship Index 0.75 0 0.66 0 0.70 0 1.26 0 0.86 0 
Entrenchment Index 2.19 2 2.03 2 1.98 2 2.37** 2 2.15 2 
Industry CARs[-10;+10] 0.009***  0.003*** -0.013** -0.005 -0.004 -0.012 -0.015** -0.016* -0.006 -0.007 
CG Target  11*** 11 10.04 10 9.91 10 7.98*** 8*** 9.37 10 
Leverage Target  0.51 0.19 0.64 0.19 0.91 0.32** 0.62 0.35*** 0.68 0.25 
Observations 227 227 243  243 205 205 252 252 927  927 
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Table VII: Binomial logistic regressions – Type I 
The table reports the results from four binomial regressions with the dependent variable being set  to 1 if an acquisition is of Type I and to zero if it belongs to the other three types. The four types are as 
defined in Table V. The variables are defined in Table III. Z-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type I – CAR [-2;+2] Type I – CAR [-10;+10] 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Majority Stock Payment -0.437*** 
(-2.64) 
    
-0.252 
(-1.57) 
    
Majority Cash Payment 
 
0.261* 
(1.66) 
0.257 
(1.63) 
   
0.180 
(1.17) 
0.178 
(1.15) 
  
Analysts‘ Revision mean 
 
0.016*** 
(3.78) 
    
0.009** 
(2.56) 
   
Analysts‘ Revision median 
  
0.017*** 
(3.94) 
    
0.009** 
(2.50) 
  
Analysts‘revision dummy  0.572*** 
(3.60) 
    
-0.532*** 
(3.38) 
    
CG Target 
 
   
0.203*** 
(2.60) 
    
0.205** 
(2.35) 
 
Leverage - Target 
 
    
0.132* 
(1.75) 
    
-0.111 
(-0.73) 
Constant  -1.215*** 
(-10.69) 
-1.393*** 
(-11.45) 
-1.399*** 
(-11.48) 
-3.585*** 
(-4.16) 
-1.617*** 
(-9.68) 
-1.227*** 
(-10.81) 
-1.271*** 
(-10.85) 
-1.269*** 
(-10.85) 
-3.714*** 
(-4.14) 
-1.450*** 
(-8.34) 
Observations 927 927 927 137 283 927 927 927 137 283 
LR Chi²(5) 19.59*** 22.50*** 24.41*** 7.48*** 3,40* 13.59*** 9.16** 8.72** 7.10*** 0.800* 
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Table VIII: Binomial logistic regressions - Type II 
The table reports the results from four binomial regressions with the dependent variable 
being set to 1 if an acquisition is of Type II and to zero if it belongs to the other three 
groups. The four groups are as defined in Table V. The variables are defined in Table III.  
Z-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type II – CAR  
[-2;+2] 
Type II – CAR  
[-10;+10] 
 Model 6 Model 6 
Industry CARs 
[-2;+2] and [-10;+10], respectively 
-6.369** 
(-2.27) 
-2.512** 
(-2.10) 
Constant  -1.067*** 
(-13.97) 
-1.049*** 
(-13.79) 
   
Observations 927 927 
LR Chi²(5) 5.24** 4.49** 
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Table IX: Binomial logistic regressions – Type III 
The table reports the results from four binomial regressions with the dependent variable being set to 1 if an acquisition is of Type III and to zero if it belongs to the other three types. The four types are as 
defined in Table V. The variables are defined in Table III. Z-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type III – CAR [-2;+2] Type III – CAR [-10;+10] 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Majority Stock Payment 0.570*** 
(3.60) 
     
0.410** 
(2.56) 
     
Majority Cash Payment 
 
-0.372** 
(-2.37) 
     
-0.299* 
(-1.89) 
    
Ln (Q-Market Adjusted) 
  
0.384*** 
(2.88) 
     
0.060 
(1.59) 
   
Ln (Q-Industry Adjusted) 
   
0.391*** 
(2.72) 
     
0.063 
(1.60) 
  
Ln (BtM -Market Adjusted) 
    
-0.301*** 
(-2.84) 
     
-0.273** 
(-2.56) 
 
PE 
     
0.001 
(0.85) 
     
0.001 
(0.52) 
Constant  -1.463***  
(-13.63) 
-1.032***  
(-9.41) 
-1.389*** 
(-13.83) 
-1.359***  
(-14.19) 
-1.363*** 
(-14.28) 
-1.220*** 
(-12.67) 
-1.429***  
(-13.46) 
-1.105***  
(-9.90) 
-1.333*** 
(-14.33) 
-1.326*** 
(-14.62) 
-1.387*** 
(-14.45) 
-1.263*** 
(-12.90) 
             
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 723 927 927 927 927 927 723 
LR Chi²(5) 12.90*** 5.63** 8.19*** 7.33*** 8.06*** 0.68 6.53** 3.56* 2.44 2.46 6.52** 0.26 
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Table X: Binomial logistic regressions –Type IV 
The table reports the results from four binomial regressions with the dependent variable being set to 1 if an acquisition is of Type IV and to zero if it belongs to the other three groups. The 
four groups are as defined in Table V. The variables are defined in Table III. Z-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 Type IV – CAR [-2;+2] Type IV – CAR [-10;+10] 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 1 5 Model 16 Model 17 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 1 7 
Analysts‘ Revision mean -0.007** 
(-2.03) 
 
-0.006*  
(-1.85) 
 
 -0.0055* 
(-1.72) 
 
-0.005 
(-1.59) 
 
 
Analysts‘ Revision 
median 
 -0.007** 
(-1.98) 
 
-0.007** 
(-1.96) 
 
 
-0.006* 
(-1.73) 
 
-0.006* 
(-1.70) 
 
Analysts‘ Revision 
dummy  
 
   
-0.364** 
(-2.26) 
    
-0.341** 
(-2.11) 
CG Index  0.002 
(0.09) 
  
 
 
0.038 
(1.41) 
  
 
CG Dictatorship Index 0.057*** 
(2.86) 
   
 0.046** 
(2.32) 
   
 
Entrenchment Index  
 
0.100* 
(1.83) 
0.100* 
(1.83) 
 
  
0.155*** 
(2.81) 
0.155*** 
(2.81) 
 
Constant -1.000*** 
(-12.92) 
-0.964*** 
(-3.75) 
-1.152*** 
(-8.00) 
-1.147*** 
(-7.95) 
-0.853*** 
(-9.70) 
-1.009*** 
(-13.03) 
-1.314*** 
(-5.03) 
-1.285*** 
(-8.72) 
-1.281*** 
(-8.69) 
-0.877*** 
(-9.91) 
Observations 927 927 871 871 927 927 927 871 871 927 
LR Chi²(5) 11.76*** 4.64* 7.21** 7.86** 5.24** 7.83** 5.21* 10.68*** 11.18*** 4.57** 
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Table XI: Binomial logistic regressions – Acquisition type classification based on CARs [-2;+2] 
The table reports the results from four binomial regressions with the dependent variable being set to 1 if an acquisition is of Type I, II, III and IV, respectively, and to zero if it 
belongs to the other three types. The four types are as defined in Table IV. The variables are defined in Table III. Z-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type I Type II Type III Type IV 
 Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. Effect Coefficient Marg. effect 
Majority Stock Payment -0.418** 
(-2.39) 
-0.070** 
(-2.47) 
-0.283* 
(-1.74) 
-0.053* 
(-1.77) 
0.491*** 
(2.99) 
0.087*** 
(2.93) 
0.149 
(0.95) 
0.030 
(0.95) 
Ln(BtM-Market 
Adjusted) 
0.172 
(1.42) 
0.030 
(1.42) 
0.165 
(1.50) 
0.032 
(1.50) 
-0.186* 
(-1.68) 
-0.032* 
(-1.69) 
-0.168 
(-1.60) 
-0.033 
(-1.60) 
Analysts‘ Revision mean 0.013***  
(3.18) 
0.002*** 
(3.17) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
0.000 
(0.31) 
-0.008** 
(-2.08) 
-0.001** 
(-2.09) 
-0.006* 
 (-1.84) 
-0.001* 
(-1.84) 
CG Dictatorship Index -0.002 
(-0.11) 
-0.000 
(-0.11) 
-0.049*  
(-1.89) 
-0.009* 
(-1.90) 
-0.041 
(-1.39) 
-0.007 
(-1.39) 
0.063*** 
(3.11) 
0.012*** 
(3.12) 
Industry CARs [-2;+2] 15.100***  
(4.87) 
2.606*** 
(4.97) 
-6.644** 
(-2.32) 
-1.266** 
(-2.33) 
-4.412 
(-1.48) 
-0.756 
(-1.49) 
-2.840 
(-1.03) 
-0.563 
(-1.03) 
Constant -1.040*** 
(-9.46) 
 -0.865*** 
(-8.39) 
 -1.478*** 
(-12.43) 
 -1.143*** 
 (-10.58) 
 
Observations 927  927  927  927  
LR Chi²(5) 54.53***  15.16***  26.88***  17.11***  
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Table XII: Binomial logistic regressions – Acquisitions’ characteristics – Acquisition type classification based on CARs [-10;+10] 
The table reports the results from four binomial regressions with the dependent variable being set to 1 if an acquisition is of Type I, II, III and IV, respectively, and to zero if it 
belongs to the other three types. The four types are as defined in Table V. The variables are defined in Table III. Z-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type I Type II Type III Type IV 
 Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect 
Majority Stock Payment -0.200 
(-1.20) 
-0.036 
(-1.21) 
-0.219 
(-1.36) 
-0.042 
(-1.38) 
0.311* 
(1.88) 
0.054* 
(1.85) 
0.115 
(0.73) 
0.023 
 (0.73) 
Ln (BtM-Market 
Adjusted) 
0.223*  
(1.91) 
0.040* 
(1.91) 
0.091 
(0.84) 
0.018 
(0.84) 
-0.198* 
(-1.78) 
-0.034* 
(-1.78) 
-0.116 
(-1.10) 
-0.023 
(-1.10) 
Analysts‘ Revision mean 0.007**  
(2.13) 
0.001** 
(2.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.000 
(-0.18) 
-0.003 
(-0.73) 
-0.000 
(-0.73) 
-0.005  
(-1.54) 
-0.001 
(-1.54) 
CG Dictatorship Index -0.026 
(-1.03) 
-0.005 
(-1.04) 
-0.030  
(-1.23) 
-0.006 
(-1.23) 
-0.008 
(-0.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.30) 
0.050** 
(2.44) 
0.010** 
(2.44) 
Industry CARs [-10;+10] 4.970*** 
(4.03) 
0.894*** 
(4.07) 
-2.414** 
(-2.01) 
-0.466** 
(-2.01) 
0.678 
(0.55) 
0.115 
(0.55) 
-3.020** 
(-2.51) 
-0.594** 
(-2.52) 
Constant -0.984*** 
(-9.19) 
 -0.904*** 
(-8.71) 
 -1.465*** 
(-12.40) 
 -1.130*** 
(-10.44) 
 
Observations 927  927  927  927  
LR Chi²(5) 30.77***  8.93  10.30*  16.07***  
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Appendix  
Table A.I: Correlation matrix 
This table contains correlation coefficients of all variables included in our different regression models. * indicates whether correlations are significant at the 10% level or better for 
the two -tailed Pearson test. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Majority Cash  
Payment 
1.00              
(2) Majority Stock  
Payment 
-0.85* 1.00             
(3) ln(BtM – market-adj.) 0.15* -0.22* 1.00            
(4) PE 0.06* -0.09* -0.08* 1.00           
(5) Ln (Q-market-adj.) -0.18* 0.27* -0.87* 0.10* 1.00          
(6) Ln (Q-Ind.-adj.) -0.19* 0.27* -0.79* 0.08* 0.91*  1.00         
(7) Analysts ’ Rev. Mean 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 1.00        
(8) Analysts ’ Rev. Med. 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.99* 1.00       
(9) % of upward rev -0.07* 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.06* 0.07* 1.00      
(10) Ind. CARs  [-2;+2] -0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.08* -0.00 0.01 0.14* 0.14* 0.03 1.00     
(11) Ind. CARs  [-10;+10] -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.06*  0.03 0.04  0.04 -0.00 0.30* 1.00    
(12) CG Index 0.10* -0.12* 0.20* -0.07* -0.25*  -0.18* 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.07* 1.00   
(13) CG Dictatorship  0.04 -0.05 0.15* -0.06 -0.15*  -0.12* 0.11* 0.11* -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.50* 1.00  
(14) Entrenchment Index 0.11* -0.15* 0.25* -0.04 -0.33*  -0.27* -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.09* 0.73* 0.34* 1.00 
 
